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Abstract 
 
We conduct an empirical investigation on the impact of pooling tasks and resources on 
throughput times in a discretionary work setting. We use an Emergency Department’s 
(ED) patient-level data (N = 234,334) from 2007 to 2010 to test our hypotheses. We find 
that when the ED’s work system had pooled tasks and resources, patients’ lengths of stay 
were longer than when the ED converted to having dedicated tasks and resources. More 
specifically, we find that dedicated systems resulted in a 9 percent overall decrease in 
length  of  stay,  which  corresponds  to  a  25-minute  reduction  in  length  of  stay  for  an 
average  patient  of  medium  severity  in  this  ED.  We  propose  that  the  improved 
performance comes from a reduction in social loafing and a more distributed utilization 
of shared resources. These benefits outweigh the expected efficiency gains from pooling, 
which are commonly predicted by queuing theory.  
 
 
 
Key  words:  pooling,  discretionary  work,  social  loafing,  shared  resources,  empirical 
operations 
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1.    Introduction 
Improving the productivity of their organizations’ operating systems is an important objective for 
managers. Pooling—an operations management technique—has been proposed as a way to improve 
performance by reducing the negative impact of demand variability (Eppen, 1979). This technique 
enables incoming work to be processed by any one of a bank of servers, which deceases the odds that an 
incoming unit of work will arrive to the processing step and have to wait, as compared to the situation 
where the unit of work can only be processed by a single dedicated server.  
Using queuing theory and associated analytical models, operations management scholars have shown 
that pooling multiple demand streams across multiple servers can enable shorter waiting times and higher 
average utilization, thereby increasing productivity (Alfaro & Corbett, 2009; Alptekinoglu, Banerjee, 
Paul, & Jain, 2012; Benjaafar, Cooper, & Kim, 2005; Corbett & Rajaram, 2006; Eppen, 1979; 
Mandelbaum & Reiman, 1998). This prediction that pooling should reduce waiting time is an important 
result for service organizations (Jouini, Dallery, & Nait-Abdallah, 2008). In this context, customers are 
the “inventory” that benefit from shorter waiting times, which in turn reduces throughput times. Service 
organization workers who operate in a pooled system have an increased level of utilization, because they 
can work on any type of incoming demand, as opposed to just one special type, and thus have less idle 
time. This increased level of utilization makes the entire operating system more productive. 
There exists a substantial body of work that examines the benefits of pooling different types of 
inventory into one system (Alfaro & Corbett, 2009; Alptekinoglu et al., 2012; Benjaafar et al., 2005; 
Corbett & Rajaram, 2006; Graves & Tomlin, 2003) and pooling multiple queues into one stream (Ata & 
Van Mieghem, 2008; Gans, Koole, & Mandelbaum, 2003; Smith & Whitt, 1981; Stidham, 1970; van 
Dijk, 2002; Wallace & Whitt, 2005; Whitt, 1992). This body of research can be characterized by two 
main factors. First, it is primarily focused on non-discretionary work settings, or “blue-collar” work, 
which involves highly specified and routine tasks (Hopp, Iravani, & Liu, 2009). This is in contrast to 
“white-collar” work, which involves professional workers who can exercise discretion over their 
intellectual and creative tasks. Second, most research on this topic has developed analytical models to 
examine the benefits of pooling.  
Yet, over the past several decades, there has been a steady shift toward service and professional jobs 
that engage workers in discretionary work as opposed to non-discretionary work. For example, a doctor 
has discretion in the plan of care she designs for her patient, a lawyer can determine how to best prepare a 
case, and a master chef has creative license in creating new dishes. However, we know very little about 
the impact of pooling in discretionary work settings. This is because it is difficult to apply many of the 
results from “blue-collar” research to “white-collar” systems, due to differences between non-
discretionary and discretionary work. In particular, the former assumes that workers are either inflexible   4 
or are given very limited flexibility, which is in fact a defining characteristic of discretionary work 
systems. In addition, given the focus of prior research on developing analytical models as opposed to 
conducting empirical studies, we know little about how human behavior affects the operational 
performance of pooled systems where workers have a high degree of discretion over their tasks. As the 
call for more empirical research in the field of operations management suggests, this a significant 
limitation because empirical research may be better equipped to explore the impact of employee 
discretion on the operational performance of pooled operations (Boudreau, Hopp, McClain, & Thomas, 
2003; Flynn, Sakakibara, Schroeder, Bates, & Flynn, 1990; Meredith, 1998; Roth & Menor, 2009; 
Scudder & Hill, 1998).  
This paper makes several contributions to research. We contribute to the operations management 
literature on pooling by examining the effect of pooling on throughput time in a discretionary work 
setting—an area that to our knowledge has been understudied. In addition, we contribute to the operations 
management literature more broadly by using empirical data to test theory related to the impact of pooling 
on worker productivity. We find that in a hospital emergency department (ED), where workers have 
discretionary control over work content, pace, and resources, pooling is associated with longer throughput 
times. This is in contrast to results predicted by queuing theory’s analytical models, which suggest that 
pooling should result in shorter throughput times.  
In particular, we examine the impact of pooling by distinguishing two types of pooling: task pooling 
and resource pooling. We define task pooling as the situation in which each worker of a group pulls his or 
her next job from a shared set of tasks that are waiting to be processed by any one of the workers. 
Similarly, resource pooling occurs when a group of workers draw from a shared set of resources that are 
available for use by any one of the workers. This distinction is made to better examine the interaction of 
human behavior and operations in our analyses of the effects of pooling. We find that task pooling and 
resource pooling are each associated with longer throughput times, which together contribute to the 
overall effect of pooling on throughput times.   
The findings of our paper have important implications for the organization of workflow in 
discretionary work settings, such as the ED. This is an especially timely finding with regard to health care 
delivery, as EDs across the country contemplate ways to handle the large increases in their patient 
volume. Our results suggest that organizing EDs so that (1) a physician is assigned to care for the patient 
upon the patient’s arrival to the ED (non-pooled tasks) and (2) each physician has a dedicated team of 
nurses working for her during the shift (non-pooled resources) may engender physician behaviors that 
result in shorter lengths of stay and increased capacity to handle larger patient volumes than if EDs were 
organized with pooled tasks and resources. 
   5 
2.    Pooling in Non-discretionary Work 
Much of the research on pooling has been conducted with reference to non-discretionary work (Hopp et 
al., 2009). In such settings, tasks are more precisely defined and controlled than in “white collar” settings. 
For example, in a manufacturing setting, an incoming unit of work is automatically processed by a 
server—which is usually a machine—as soon as one becomes available. The machine does not have 
discretion to process the work at a faster or slower speed. Each step of the process is precisely specified 
beforehand, and variation in the work does not arise as a function of personal discretion.  
Under this general framework of non-discretionary work, operations scholars have distinguished two 
types of settings in which pooling may occur: production-inventory systems and queuing networks. 
Inventory pooling, defined as “the practice of using a common pool of inventory to satisfy two or more 
sources of random demand,” has been studied in contexts such as manufacturing firms and supply chains 
(Alptekinoglu et al., 2012, p. 33). Since the seminal paper by Eppen (1979) on the benefits of 
consolidating demand, an extensive body of work developing analytical models has documented the 
effect of pooling on production-inventory systems (Alfaro & Corbett, 2009; Gerchak & He, 2003). These 
models account for factors such as utilization, demand and process variability, service levels, and 
structure of the production process to determine the impact of pooling. They overwhelmingly conclude 
that the benefits of pooling are robust to constraints such as perfectly correlated demands (Alptekinoglu et 
al., 2012), high utilization (Benjaafar et al., 2005), suboptimal inventory policies (Alfaro & Corbett, 
2009), non-normal dependent demand (Corbett & Rajaram, 2006), and long lead times (Tagaras & Cohen, 
1992).  
In queuing networks, operations researchers have focused on the effect of pooling queues, resources, 
and, to a lesser degree, tasks (Mandelbaum & Reiman, 1998). Much of this work has been conducted with 
reference to call centers, and has found that the benefits of having flexible servers and pooled queues 
outweighs its potential drawbacks (Anupindi, Chopra, Deshmukh, Van Mieghem, & Zemel, 2005; Ata & 
Van Mieghem, 2008; Gans et al., 2003; Jouini et al., 2008). Researchers have reached similar conclusions 
in other settings, such as mail delivery, and have found that pooling improves service quality while 
concurrently reducing costs (Ata & Van Mieghem, 2008). Much less work has been carried out on task 
pooling, despite Loch’s (1998) argument for its importance in thinking about alignment of incentives and 
process design.  
 
3.    Pooling in Discretionary Work 
Discretionary work is distinguished from non-discretionary work based on a comparison of the types of 
tasks that workers conduct. In contrast to non-discretionary work, as was described above, workers who   6 
engage in discretionary work function in the absence of highly prescribed and detailed operational rules. 
According to a survey of the literature by Hopp et al. (2009), discretionary work is different from non-
discretionary work in seven key ways: (i) discretionary tasks are intellectual and/or creative in nature, (ii) 
discretionary work relies more heavily on knowledge-based resources, (iii) learning is slower and more 
central in discretionary work systems, (iv) output measurement is more difficult in discretionary work 
systems, (v) discretionary work is likely to involve self-generated work in addition to externally generated 
work, (vi) workers have more discretion over processing times in discretionary work systems, and (vii) 
incentives play a more important role in discretionary work. In short, discretionary workers have the 
flexibility to make discretionary decisions to spend extra time and effort on their work, which ultimately 
affects throughput time, cost, and other operational outcome measures. Because of their capacity to make 
discretionary decisions, they are also more likely to be influenced by learning, performance measures, 
incentives, and technology.  
To our knowledge, only a handful of papers examine the effect of pooling in discretionary work 
settings on worker productivity or performance. First, Hopp et al. (2007) examine systems with 
discretionary task completion, which they define as systems under which the completion criteria for tasks 
are determined by a worker’s subjective standards. They formulate a model that predicts that, though 
smaller than in nondiscretionary task completion systems, pooling in discretionary task completion 
systems still exhibits operational benefits. This reduction in the benefit of pooling is due to the 
introduction of quality as an additional factor for buffering variability. In essence, workers with discretion 
are likely to choose to spend more time with a customer when tasks (customers) are pooled because by 
providing higher quality work to their customer, workers will reap benefits from high customer 
satisfaction while coworkers will be forced to tend to the other customers waiting for service.  
Debo and his colleagues (2008) also find that workers with discretion over their tasks can engage in 
behaviors that slow down the service rate. They examine credence services, which are discretionary work 
settings where service providers have an incentive and the ability to “skim” additional fees from an 
unknowing customer by providing more services than are actually needed. The classic example is of taxi 
cab drivers, who can earn a higher fare on a slow night by driving a customer on a longer route than 
necessary because the customer pays by distance driven rather than a flat rate. They develop a model that 
shows that under certain price structures and workload dynamics, the provider will skim money from a 
customer by slowing down the rate of service. In our setting, when patients awaiting service are pooled 
among a set of physicians, the physician will not earn additional revenue by taking more time to treat a 
current patient. However, she could benefit from a reduction in the total number of patients she is 
responsible for seeing during her shift, since any patients still waiting to be seen at the conclusion of her   7 
shift will be seen by the next physician coming on to the shift. This will lead to longer patient stays on 
average.  
Tan and Netessine (2012) examine the impact of workload on worker productivity in a discretionary 
work setting, although they do not explicitly compare the effect of pooling to that of not pooling. 
Specifically, they explore wait staff productivity in restaurants with dedicated (non-pooled) tasks, where 
servers are assigned to a section of tables, to which the host assigns diners as they arrive. Using empirical 
data from a restaurant chain, they find that employees perform more tasks when the workload is low, and 
conversely increase their productivity when the workload is higher. This finding suggests that when 
workers have discretion and are assigned dedicated tasks, they are capable of working at a slower or faster 
pace when it is beneficial to do so. 
We conduct an empirical investigation to further this line of research on the impact of pooling on 
throughput times in discretionary systems. We extend the argument presented by Hopp et al. (2007) on 
discretionary task completion systems by examining systems in which it is not only the task completion 
criteria that is discretionary but also the pace at which workers carry out the work and the resources they 
utilize. We argue that in discretionary work settings, where multiple elements of the operational process 
allow for worker discretion, pooling may be associated with an increase in throughput times. 
 
Hypothesis 1: In discretionary work settings, pooling is associated with longer throughput times 
compared to when there is no pooling of work. 
 
Next we distinguish between task pooling and resource pooling to better understand how pooling 
impacts discretionary work. First, in our examination of task pooling in discretionary work settings, we 
consider two scenarios: a dedicated task scenario in which customers waiting to enter the organization’s 
production system are assigned to a specific employee as soon as they enter the queue, and a pooled task 
scenario in which customers are assigned to a specific employee only once they enter the production 
system. In the dedicated task scenario, employees are effectively designated responsibility for a customer 
“early”, whereas in the pooled task scenario the next available employee is assigned responsibility for a 
customer when the customer enters the production system. Thus, we examine the impact of shifting the 
task responsibility boundary upstream such that incoming customers are assigned to specific employees 
rather than being pooled and able to be processed by anyone.  
In contrast to what pooling models in non-discretionary work settings predict, task pooling may have 
negative implications in discretionary work settings. An important element that has not been previously 
considered in such models is the aspect of non-random human behavior. Because human workers are 
influenced by and able to influence the nature and speed of the work in discretionary work settings, this is   8 
an important and predictable factor to consider. In particular, we argue that pooling tasks may negatively 
impact throughput times in discretionary work settings due to the tendency of individuals to engage in 
social loafing when tasks are pooled.  
The literature on social loafing suggests that having shared responsibility for work (e.g., when tasks 
are pooled) will result in lower individual effort levels as compared to when individuals have sole 
responsibility for their work (i.e., are working alone on non-pooled tasks) (Chidambaram & Tung, 2005; 
Karau & Williams, 1993; Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). This tendency for social loafing comes 
from multiple individuals having shared responsibility over a common set of tasks. This is distinct from—
though similar to—moral hazard, which refers to the tendency for an individual to take risks when the 
cost of taking the risk is shared among multiple individuals (Arrow, 1963, 1965; Pauly, 1968, 1974; 
Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971; Zeckhauser, 1970). When applied to settings with discretionary tasks, social 
loafing theory suggests that a non-pooled task assignment system that designates task responsibilities 
early on will produce shorter throughput times compared to a pooled task assignment system that does not 
proactively assign task responsibilities to individuals. This is because workers in the non-pooled task 
assignment system will be less likely to loaf in such a way that another employee will be forced to pick up 
the next unit of work that needs to be completed. Thus, in contrast to queuing theory’s prediction of a 
beneficial effect of pooling tasks on throughput times, we hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In discretionary work settings, task pooling is associated with longer throughput 
times compared to when there are dedicated tasks. 
 
In contrast to task pooling, resource pooling considers how equipment or other resources necessary to 
complete a given task are assigned to employees. We again consider two scenarios: a dedicated resource 
scenario in which a subset of resources is assigned to a specific employee, and a pooled resource scenario 
in which any employee can use any item in a set of resources that are made jointly available to all 
employees. In the pooled resource scenario, any one item in a set of resources may be used by any 
employee, and an employee may draw on as many resources as desired. In contrast, in the dedicated 
resource scenario, resources are assigned to a specific employee, and employees can only draw from the 
set of resources that has been assigned to them. Thus, if a resource is idle but the employee to whom the 
resource has been assigned is busy and cannot utilize it, the resource remains idle, even if another worker 
wishes to use it. In both scenarios, we relax the assumption of exclusivity and assume that one employee 
is able to service multiple customers simultaneously. In other words, an employee is not obligated to 
complete the service of one customer in order to begin servicing the next customer.    9 
In discretionary work settings with multiple workers working alongside one another, resource pooling 
may result in lower system performance compared to when there are dedicated resources. Given a limited 
yet shared set of resources, fast-working employees may obtain their speed by engaging in self-serving 
practices that are suboptimal at the system-level, such as parallel processing work by using multiple 
resources or over-utilizing resources on non-essential tasks (Shapiro, 1998). While such tactics may speed 
up their own work times and enhance their customers’ perception of their work, fast workers can 
ultimately reduce coworkers’ productivity, either by causing rework or by creating equipment shortages 
for other workers. This suggests that, with pooled resources, fast-working employees may exhibit a 
negative effect on their coworkers’ productivity by extensively utilizing shared resources and forcing 
others to wait until the resources become free. This results in longer overall throughput times because fast 
workers use more than their fair share of resources and create waste by using resources on non-essential 
tasks. We note that pooling resources may reduce individual throughput times for the fast workers, but we 
focus on the system-level effect on average throughput times because systems seek to maximize overall 
productivity. Thus, in contrast to predictions made by models used in non-discretionary work settings, we 
hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3: In discretionary work settings, resource pooling is associated with longer 
throughput times compared to when there are dedicated resources.  
 
 
4.    Setting, Data, and Empirical Methods 
We conducted our study in a hospital’s Emergency Department (ED). An ED is a discretionary work 
setting where tasks and resources can be pooled or dedicated. We refer to the care of a patient from arrival 
to discharge as a single task, which is comprised of numerous sub-tasks that are carried out over the 
course of a patient’s ED visit. The comprehensive set of staff and equipment that supports the physician’s 
work of caring for a patient are considered the available resources. For example, the x-ray machines, x-
ray technicians, lab technicians, and nurses—all of which are available in limited supply—are considered 
resources that are utilized by physicians to carry out their task of caring for patients presenting to the ED.  
 
4.1.   Research Setting 
Our data come from the ED of a 162-bed community hospital in northern California. This hospital was 
part of a larger network of 37 hospitals. We selected this ED for study because it experienced an 
intervention—described in more detail below—that transformed part of the ED from a pooled system to a 
dedicated system. This intervention enabled us to test hypotheses related to the impact of pooling on   10 
physician productivity. We measured physician performance by their patients’ length of stay in the ED, 
from March 2007 to July 2010. Depending on the time of day, the ED had two to five physicians staffing 
41 ED beds and up to nine hallway gurneys. This ED saw approximately 68,937 patients annually, with 
an average 5 percent increase in census each year from 2007 to 2010. This was a relatively large patient 
census in comparison to other EDs in the surrounding areas. 
There was a standardized patient flow process. Upon a patient’s arrival, a registration clerk conducted 
a brief registration process. A triage nurse then obtained vital signs, collected the chief complaint, and 
assigned an Emergency Severity Index (ESI) triage category, which is a standard ranking of ED patient 
severity that ranges from levels 1 (highest acuity) through 5 (lowest acuity). Higher acuity patients (ESI 
levels 1, 2, or 3) were treated in the main area (main ED). Lower acuity patients (ESI levels 4 or 5) were 
treated in the Rapid Care Area (RCA), unless they arrived after 11pm or before 7am, in which case they 
were treated in the main ED because the RCA was closed. Physicians arrived at staggered times 
throughout the day, such that there was not a certain time at which all physicians changed shifts. 
Physicians could change shifts on the hour between 5am and 11am, between 2pm and 5pm, and at 11pm 
or midnight. There was usually one physician working in the RCA and four physicians working in the 
main ED. Physicians were assigned to a particular location in the ED for the duration of their shift by the 
physician shift scheduler. Physicians were paid a flat rate for their shift without any additional 
compensation for the amount of services provided to patients or the number of hours worked. Thus, there 
were no incentives to stretch out treatment times by providing additional services. 
 
4.2.   Intervention: Switching from Pooled to Dedicated Tasks and Resources 
In the main ED, an intervention—called the Team Assignment System (TAS)—was implemented in 
August 2008. TAS effectively restructured the main ED from having pooled tasks and pooled resources to 
dedicated tasks and dedicated resources. Prior to the TAS intervention, after being triaged, all main ED 
patients returned to the waiting room until a main ED bed became available. A specific physician was 
assigned to care for the patient once a patient had been placed in a bed, and not before. At this point, the 
triage nurse assigned the patient to a physician in a round-robin fashion. Hence, patient assignment was 
random rather than due to a physician’s speed of discharging patients, and physicians were not able to 
select which patient they wanted to take next. Thus, before the intervention, the tasks (i.e., patients 
waiting in the waiting room) were pooled as they could end up being served by any of the physicians 
currently working in the main ED. Before the TAS intervention, physicians also utilized a set of pooled 
resources (e.g. nurses), which they shared with all other physicians currently working in the main ED. For 
example, a physician chose one nurse to work with concerning the care of a given patient, but the same   11 
nurse likely was also caring for other patients, who might be assigned to different physicians. Thus, 
resources were also pooled in the pre-TAS period. 
With the implementation of TAS, patients were assigned during triage to a team of one ED physician 
and two ED nurses who exclusively worked together throughout the duration of their shifts. Thus, after 
TAS implementation, physicians had dedicated nursing resources and dedicated tasks (i.e., patients). 
Patients were still assigned to physicians in a round-robin fashion, so patient assignment remained 
independent of a physician’s speed of discharging patients. When a physician logged into the patient 
management system on one of the ED computers, his or her display clearly showed which patients were 
assigned to his or her team. Physicians were expected to complete their care for the cohort of patients 
assigned to them prior to leaving the shift. In other words, they were expected to continue working in the 
ED until care was complete for every one of their assigned patients, even if their assigned patients were 
still in the waiting room at the scheduled end of the physician’s shift. The change in patient assignment 
removed the incentive to engage in social loafing because physicians were unable off-load their work 
onto the oncoming shift of physicians, and because they were paid a flat rate for the shift rather than a 
variable rate by the number of hours worked. 
In the RCA, a single physician worked with pooled tasks and dedicated resources for the entire 
duration of our study. Patients were assigned to the physician on shift when they were called to be seen in 
the RCA’s examination room, not when they were in the waiting room. In other words, a physician on a 
shift in the RCA was not responsible for any patient who was still waiting in the waiting room at the 
conclusion of her shift; any patient still waiting was now the responsibility of the next physician coming 
on to the shift. In effect, patients were “pooled tasks” waiting to be seen by a physician.  
A physician working in the RCA was assigned one nurse (which could be considered the key 
resource for a physician). The physician-nurse team staffing the RCA had access to a designated supply 
of equipment and medicine set aside for RCA use, such that they did not need to share most of these 
resources with other physicians concurrently working in the main ED. Figure 1 provides a visual 
representation of the pooled and dedicated resources and tasks in the main ED and RCA before and after 
TAS implementation.  
 
----------------------- Insert Figure 1 About Here ----------------------- 
 
4.3.   Data 
This study used four years of de-identified electronic medical record (EMR) data of all 243,248 patients 
treated in the ED from March 1, 2007 to July 31, 2010. The data extracted from the EMR contained the 
following patient-level information: the patient’s time of arrival and departure, length of stay, acuity   12 
level, attending physician, and disposition. We excluded patients with no attending physician or acuity 
level listed on their record, and patients who had a length of stay of 0 minutes or less. In addition, we 
excluded patients whose length of stay was greater than 48 hours; most of these patients presented with a 
psychological condition and were waiting to be discharged to an appropriate facility. We excluded these 
observations from our dataset because their extended length of stay was driven by placement logistics 
rather than a physician’s level of productivity. Altogether, this resulted in an exclusion of 4,208 patients, 
which constituted 1.72 percent of the overall sample.  
Using the final sample of 239,040 patients, we created a panel dataset that treats the physician as the 
panel variable. For the regression analysis, we limited our sample to the 234,334 patients who were seen 
by physicians who were full-time employees of this ED. We chose to limit our sample in this way to be 
able to construct reliable measures of a physician’s permanent productivity, which was necessary to 
categorize fast workers and, in turn, capture the presence of a fast worker on a given shift. Physicians who 
worked in this ED but were not full-time employees tended to be employees of other hospitals in the 
network who were brought in to cover small portions of shifts when the full-time ED physicians were not 
able to staff the ED (e.g., during physician staff meetings). 
 
4.4.   Dependent Variable 
To measure throughput time, we used the patient’s length of stay in the ED, which was measured in 
minutes and defined as the time from a patient’s arrival to the ED to his or her discharge from the ED. 
These data were obtained directly from the hospital’s EMR system. We log-transformed this variable 
because the distribution was otherwise right-skewed. 
 
4.5.   Independent Variables 
  4.5.1.  Non-pooling intervention in main ED. The implementation of the Team Assignment 
System (TAS) marked the time at which the main ED transitioned from having pooled tasks and pooled 
resources to dedicated (or non-pooled) tasks and dedicated resources. We captured this transition with a 
binary variable that was equal to 1 after the implementation of TAS and 0 before the implementation of 
TAS. Because it was unknown on exactly what date of August 2008 the TAS system had been 
implemented, and in order to account for an acclimation period, we omitted data from August 2008 in 
constructing the variable for TAS. We designated the pre-TAS period to include up to July 31, 2008 and 
the post-TAS period to begin with September 1, 2008. 
  4.5.2.  Presence of a fast worker. To examine the impact of resource pooling on throughput times, 
we assessed whether the presence of a fast physician resulted in shorter or longer overall throughput 
times. We measured the presence of a fast physician as a binary variable. As has been done in previous   13 
studies of fast workers (Mas & Moretti, 2009), we first determined each physician’s permanent 
productivity level by calculating the average length of stay for patients treated by the physician, adjusting 
for a full set of control variables that include the patient’s acuity level, the date and time of admission, 
and the number of other physicians on that shift, among others (a discussion of each of the control 
variables is presented in the next subsection). We then categorized physicians whose permanent 
productivity level was greater than the 50
th percentile as “fast physicians”. Because we were interested in 
the effect of the presence of any other fast worker, regardless of focal worker’s productivity level, we 
constructed the binary variable such that it equals 1 if there was at least one above-average productivity 
physician on the shift and 0 if there was no above-average productivity physician on the shift, not 
accounting for the productivity level of the focal physician. We also considered an alternate specification, 
in which we categorized physicians with permanent productivity levels above the 25
th percentile as “fast 
physicians”. As an additional robustness check, we conducted similar analyses using a continuous 
measure of having an additional fast physician on a shift. 
 
4.6.   Control Variables 
We accounted for several other factors that may have affected a patient’s length of stay and may be 
correlated with our independent variables of interest. To account for the variation in length of stay due to 
the severity of a patient’s condition, we controlled for the patient’s acuity level (ESI level 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) 
using a series of dummy variables. We controlled for the number of patients currently in the ED and the 
total number of other physicians working at the same time during a physician’s shift to capture ED 
congestion. We also controlled for the general time frame of the physician’s shift (AM, PM, or overnight) 
and the location of the shift (main ED or RCA) to account for systematic differences in patients’ length of 
stay that would arise from differences in structural elements of the ED. To account for a physician’s 
experience, both within and beyond the ED, we controlled for the number of years since graduation from 
medical school and the number of shifts the physician had worked in this particular ED since the 
beginning of the dataset up until the point of each patient encounter. Lastly, we accounted for time trends 
and related influences by adding dummy variables for each day of week, each month, and each calendar 
year. 
 
4.7.   Empirical Models 
To test our hypotheses, we used linear regression models with physician fixed effects and clustered 
standard errors. Standard errors were clustered at the physician level to account for within-physician 
correlations of the error terms, both within and across shifts, rather than imposing the usual assumption 
that all error terms are independently and identically distributed. The fixed effects model allowed us to   14 
control for unobservable individual physician effects that do not vary over time, such as level of 
motivation, innate ability, and practice routines. This is important to account for because they may 
significantly influence a physician’s productivity level in ways that cannot be measured otherwise.  
Specifically, we estimated the following models:  
 
lnLOSij = b0 +b1fastothersij +b2TASij +d'Xij +g MDi +eij   (1) 
lnLOSij =f0 +f1fastothersij +f2TASij +f3TASij ´mainij +d'Xij +g MDi +eij   (2) 
lnLOSij =h0 +h1fastothersij +h2TASij +h3TASij ´ fastothersij +d'Xij +g MDi +eij   (3) 
 
In these models, lnLOSij represents the logged number of minutes that patient i of physician j stayed 
in the ED; fastothers represents the presence of a fast physician on the shift besides the focal physician; 
TAS indicates whether the Team Assignment System (TAS) has been implemented; TAS  main is an 
interaction term of whether the TAS system has been implemented and whether the shift was located in 
the main ED; TAS  fastothers is an interaction term of whether the TAS system has been implemented 
and whether a fast physician was present on the shift; X is a column vector of covariates; prime () 
denotes transpose; MD represents each physician; ’s, ’s, ’s, and ’s represent vectors of coefficients;  
represents physician fixed effects; and  is the time-varying error term not already captured by . The 
column vector of covariates, X, includes all control variables described in the previous subsection, which 
includes year fixed effects to control for time trends as well as the main effect for the shift location 
indicator variable, main. Table 1 provides summary definitions for all variables included in these models.  
 
----------------------- Insert Table 1 About Here ----------------------- 
 
To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate Model 1 using the data from the main ED. We exclude data from 
the RCA because there was no change in work structure in the ED throughout the study period, whereas 
the main ED moved from having a pooled system to a dedicated system. We estimate the overall impact 
of this transition from having a pooled system to a dedicated system in the main ED by examining 2, the 
coefficient on TAS. We predict that 2 is negative and significant. 
To test Hypothesis 2, we estimate Model 2 using data from both the main ED and the RCA. We 
employ a difference-in-differences estimator to compare the difference in average throughput times in the 
two locations before TAS implementation to the difference after TAS implementation. Because the RCA 
remained under a system in which tasks were pooled, whereas the main ED moved from having pooled   15 
tasks to dedicated tasks, we can consider the shifts worked in the RCA as comprising the untreated 
comparison group and those worked in the main ED as comprising the treatment group. To apply the 
difference-in-differences method, we first establish the parallel trend assumption and calculate 
autocorrelation-consistent standard errors (Abadie, 2005; Duflo, 2001). We then estimate the effect of 
task pooling on throughput times by examining the coefficient on the interaction term, TAS  main. We 
predict that this coefficient, 3, will be negative and significant, suggesting that having dedicated tasks is 
associated with shorter throughput times and having pooled tasks is associated with longer throughput 
times.  
Lastly, to test Hypothesis 3, we estimate Model 3 using data from the main ED. To investigate the 
effect of pooling resources on throughput times, we leverage the presence of other workers who are fast, 
who may increase overall throughput times under a system with pooled resources. For this analysis, we 
exclude data from the RCA because there is only one physician on a given shift, and therefore no 
possibility of being influenced by another worker in the RCA who is fast. Using the effect of fast 
coworkers as a proxy, we estimate the effect of moving from having pooled resources to dedicated 
resources on throughput times by examining 3, the coefficient on TAS  fastothers. We predict that 3 is 
negative and significant.  
In addition to the standard assumptions of linear regression models, fixed effects models make two 
key assumptions, both of which are satisfied in our study. First is the assumption of strict exogeneity, 
which means that the error term of the model is uncorrelated with each of the covariates in all time 
periods (Wooldridge, 2010). This is a plausible assumption to make in our context, because the patient 
error term is unlikely to be correlated with the covariates for other patients. In addition, the random traits 
of patients that affect their length of stay are not likely to be associated with the key independent variables 
of interest. Specifically, the round-robin assignment of patients to physicians makes it unlikely for the 
fastest physicians to receive the most complicated cases. In other words, patient assignment to physicians 
is random and is not driven by physician speed or physician preference. Furthermore, because we are 
within the context of an emergency room, in which incoming patient complexity is hard to predict ahead 
of time, it is unlikely that the best performing physicians would be assigned to shifts with the most 
challenging cases. In addition, we do not expect that there were changes in patient traits over time that 
were differentially affecting patients seen in the main ED and the RCA.   
We choose to use fixed effects models rather than random effects models because we do not believe 
that the random effects assumption of zero correlation between the physician effect and the covariates 
(such as the number of shifts worked by the physician, or the number of years since graduating from 
medical school) would necessarily hold. By using fixed effects models, we are able to account for the 
unobserved traits of each physician that are associated with a patient’s length of stay that are also   16 
correlated with the independent variables of interest. Accordingly, we conducted the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test, which rejected the random effects models in favor of the fixed effects models (
2 > 68.52, 
p < 0.001 for all three models). 
 
5.    Results 
5.1.   Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations for all continuous variables and percentages 
for all categorical or binary variables included in the models. In particular, we find that the average length 
of stay for a patient seen in this ED was 220 minutes (s.d. = 243). Specifically, the average length of stay 
was 277 minutes (s.d. = 271) for a patient seen in the main ED and 106 minutes (s.d. = 105) for a patient 
seen in the RCA. An average ED physician had almost 13 years of experience working as a physician, 
and worked on average 276 shifts (s.d. = 166) in this ED between March 1, 2007 and July 31, 2010. On 
average, 35 patients (s.d. = 12) were in this ED at any given time. 
 
----------------------- Insert Table 2 About Here ----------------------- 
 
Less than 1 percent of patients were of acuity level 1, whereas 51 percent were of acuity level 3 and 
39 percent were of acuity level 4. Patients were approximately uniformly distributed across days of the 
week and months of the year. An increasing number of patients presented to this ED in recent years, with 
approximately half arriving during the PM shift and another 13 percent arriving during the overnight shift. 
Approximately 67 percent of patients were seen in the main ED and 86 percent of patients were seen 
while his or her attending physician had an above-average productivity physician on his or her shift.  
As expected, patients’ average length of stay differed significantly by their level of acuity. Table 3 
presents the means and standard deviations of patients’ average length of stay by acuity level, as well as 
the frequencies of each acuity level. We note that the relationship between the length of stay and acuity 
level was not a completely monotonic one. While there was a general monotonic trend in which patients 
of a lower acuity level (e.g., acuity level 5) had a shorter length of stay, patients of acuity level 2 had a 
significantly longer length of stay than those of acuity level 1. Based on observations at our study site and 
conversations with ED personnel, this appeared to be attributable to three reasons. First, a large fraction 
of acuity level 1 patients were too severely ill to be treated or resuscitated. This resulted in a truncating 
effect in which several acuity level 1 patients had relatively short lengths of stay due to death. Second, 
due to the severity of their illness, many acuity level 1 patients were quickly admitted to other 
departments (e.g., the Intensive Care Unit) or were taken to the Operating Room. This also had a 
truncating effect on these patients’ lengths of stay. Third, most patients presenting with a psychological   17 
condition were acuity level 2, and these patients often had longer stays in the ED due to difficulties in 
finding an appropriate facility to which they could be discharged. These qualitative statements seemed to 
be supported by our data, given the large variation in length of stay of acuity level 1 patients (s.d. = 211) 
and the fact that only 0.33 percent of all patients (879 patients over a period of five years) fell into this 
category. Because we adjust for patient acuity using a dummy variable for each acuity level, the non-
linearity of the relationship between acuity level and length of stay does not meaningfully affect our 
analysis.  
 
----------------------- Insert Table 3 About Here ----------------------- 
 
5.2.   Tests of Hypotheses 
We estimated the three models specified in the previous section to test each of our hypotheses. The results 
of our analyses are summarized in Table 4. 
 
----------------------- Insert Table 4 About Here ----------------------- 
 
We start by examining the overall effect of pooling on throughput times. Model 1 of Table 4 presents 
a fixed effects model that includes all control variables and captures the effect of moving from a pooled 
system to a dedicated system (i.e., the negative of the pooling effect). The negative coefficient on TAS 
indicates that the transition from a pooled system to a dedicated system is associated with a highly 
significant reduction on patients’ lengths of stay (2 = 0.09, p < 0.001). This 8.86 percent decrease in a 
patient’s length of stay after the implementation of TAS corresponds to a decrease of 25.1 minutes for an 
average patient of acuity level 3 seen in the main ED. In other words, the average patient’s length of stay 
was significantly longer in the pooled system than in the dedicated system. This offers strong support for 
H1, which predicted that pooling is associated with longer throughput times in discretionary work 
settings.  
Model 2 of Table 4 adds an interaction term of TAS implementation and the shift’s location. We find 
that the difference in throughput times between the main ED and the RCA is greater prior to TAS 
implementation when tasks were pooled in both the main ED and the RCA. Once the main ED adopted a 
dedicated task system, this difference in throughput times reduced. This difference-in-differences is 
captured by the coefficient on TAS  main (3 = 0.10, p < 0.001). This 9.90 percent decrease in a 
patient’s length of stay in the main ED after TAS implementation corresponds to a decrease of 28 minutes 
for an average patient of acuity level 3 presenting to the main ED. This finding offers strong support for   18 
H2, which predicted that, in discretionary work settings, task pooling is associated with longer throughput 
times compared to when tasks are dedicated. 
Model 3 of Table 4 substitutes the interaction term of TAS implementation and the shift’s location 
with the interaction term of TAS implementation and the presence of other fast physicians. We find that 
when resources are pooled in the main ED, the presence of fast coworkers on one’s shift is associated 
with a significantly longer length of stay for the average patient. This suggests that, under a system with 
pooled resources, fast physicians (who tend to draw on a greater amount of shared resources) negatively 
impact the productivity of their coworkers. This effect is captured by the coefficient on TAS  fastothers 
(3 = 0.08, p < 0.001), which shows that the transition from having pooled resources to having dedicated 
resources in the main ED was associated with a 7.75 percent decrease in an average patient’s length of 
stay. This corresponds to a 21.9-minute decrease that occurred when” the main ED moved to a dedicated 
resource system. This finding supports H3, which predicted that, in discretionary work settings, resource 
pooling is associated with longer throughput times compared to when resources are dedicated. 
 
5.3.   Specification Tests 
To examine the robustness of our models, we tested a variety of other specifications in addition to the 
reported models. Specifically, we examined an alternative specification of the fastothers variable that was 
used in our models to indicate the presence of a fast physician on a focal physician’s shift. We used an 
indicator variable for an above-25
th percentile productivity physician as opposed to an above-average 
(50
th percentile) productivity physician. With this alternative specification, we found that the transition 
from a pooled system to a dedicated system resulted in an 8.92 percent decrease in a patient’s length of 
stay (2 = 0.09, p < 0.001). We found that the transition from pooled to dedicated tasks was associated 
with a 9.92 percent decrease in length of stay (3 = 0.10, p < 0.001), and that the transition from pooled 
to dedicated resources was associated with a 3.53 percent decrease in the same measure (3 = 0.04, p < 
0.001). Specifically regarding the last measure, on the effect of transitioning from pooled to dedicated 
resources, we note that the magnitude of the effect is smaller than it was in the original specification. This 
is not surprising because the alternate specification resulted in a stricter definition of who is considered a 
“fast physician”, and it is to be expected that the overall negative effect of fast workers under a pooled 
resource system is dampened when there are fewer fast workers. Thus, our findings for all three 
hypotheses remained robust to this alternate specification.  
Our results do not appear to be due to the different types of patients that are typically cared for in the 
two areas of the ED. To examine this, we assessed whether the transition from a pooled system to a 
dedicated system differentially affected length of stay depending on a patient’s acuity level. To conduct 
this analysis, we used the same models as those specified above, but limited to patients of acuity levels 4   19 
and 5, and with each independent variable of interest interacted with acuity level 5. We limited the sample 
to patients of these two acuity levels because they constituted the group of patients who were potentially 
seen in both areas of the ED (because all acuity 4 and 5 patients were seen in the main ED after 11pm). 
This analysis suggests that there are no differential effects by patient acuity level (the p-values of all 
independent variables of interest interacted with acuity level 5 ranged from 0.67 to 0.70).  
We also included all observations that had previously been excluded as outliers (i.e., observations 
with a length of stay greater than 48 hours). All coefficients of interest and their corresponding 
significance levels remained robust to this specification.  
Lastly, we used hierarchical linear models, which specify random rather than fixed effects at the 
physician level. This specification test was conducted in order to test each of our hypotheses with greater 
efficiency gains. Here, we used three levels for our multilevel analyses: patient-level, physician shift-
level, and physician-level. The effect of transitioning from a pooled to a dedicated system remained 
robust (2 = 0.09, p < 0.001), as did the effect of moving from pooled to dedicated tasks (3 = 0.10, p < 
0.001) and resources (3 = 0.07, p < 0.001). Thus, the magnitude and significance of all coefficients of 
interest remained robust to this alternative specification. 
 
6.    Discussion and Conclusions 
Using EMR data from a hospital’s ED over four years, we find that counter to what queuing theory would 
predict, pooling may increase throughput times in discretionary work settings. More specifically, we find 
that patients have longer lengths of stay when ED physicians work in systems with pooled tasks and 
resources, as opposed to when they work in systems with dedicated tasks and resources. We assert that 
the improved performance with dedicated tasks comes from a reduction in social loafing, which is largely 
left unchecked when tasks are pooled for processing by any physician rather than assigned to an 
individual physician. The improved performance with dedicated resources comes from a more distributed 
utilization of shared resources, in which fast-working physicians are prevented from over-utilizing shared 
resources that are necessary to conduct process tasks. 
In the context of our study setting, we find it particularly important to consider the significance of the 
effect sizes found in our analyses. For example, in Model 1 of Table 4, we find that moving from a pooled 
system to a dedicated system is associated with an 8.86 percent decrease in a patient’s length of stay. For 
an average patient of acuity level 3 seen in the main ED, this corresponds to a decrease of 25.1 minutes. 
This is a particularly meaningful difference in the context of a hospital’s emergency room. With 
approximately 200 patients in the ED every day, this is roughly equivalent to an additional 83.7 patient-  20 
hours per day that were saved with the dedicated system. Once we take into account the large costs 
associated with emergency room care, it becomes clear that the time and cost implications are substantial.  
We note that, unlike much prior work on the impact of pooling, we focus on throughput times as 
opposed to specifically waiting times. This was not possible with our empirical data, because it was not 
possible to determine at what stages and how much time a patient spent waiting once entering a RCA 
examination room or being placed in a main ED bed, thus making it difficult to accurately distinguish 
processing time from waiting time. Future research should consider separately measuring the effect of 
pooling on processing times versus waiting times.  
 
6.1.   Theoretical Contributions 
This paper contributes to the operations management literature on pooling in several ways. We use 
empirical data to examine the effect of pooling on throughput time in a discretionary work setting. We 
find that when workers have discretionary control over the pace and resources involved in carrying out 
their work and no incentive for speeding up their work, pooling results in longer throughput times.  
Queuing theory about non-discretionary work settings would suggest instead that pooling would result in 
shorter throughput times (Jouini et al., 2008). Thus, our paper provides empirical support for prior 
mathematical models that predicted that human behaviors could reduce the positive benefit of pooling 
(Hopp et al., 2007; Jouini et al., 2008).  
Our result is related to Debo et al.’s (2008) finding that service providers who have discretion over 
the set of tasks performed for customers may increase the time required to deliver service if they have an 
incentive to do so. We find empirical evidence to support their claim, although in our setting it is not a 
financial incentive, but rather a social loafing incentive for slowing down the service rate that triggers this 
behavior.  In Debo et al.’s (2008) study, the customer’s lack of visibility into the true level of services that 
should be provided enables workers to increase throughput time, whereas in our setting—similar to Jouini 
et al. (2008)—the lack of management visibility into work pace enables longer throughput times to exist. 
Our study suggests that managers of discretionary work systems should design control mechanisms to 
mitigate behaviors that benefit the employee to the detriment of the customers or the organization. We 
find that one mechanism is to make the workload constant regardless of work pace, which removes the 
benefit of slowing down. Future research could examine whether this arrangement creates other problems, 
such as a speeding up that results in lower quality.  
Unlike prior research in this domain (Corbett & Rajaram, 2006; Debo et al., 2008; Jouini et al., 2008), 
we use empirical data to study how task pooling and resource pooling affect the productivity of workers 
who engage in discretionary work. In doing so, we are able to quantify the effects of pooling in an actual 
working environment. In our context of a hospital ED, we find that having a pooled system, as opposed to   21 
a dedicated system, is associated with a 9 percent increase in patients’ length of stay. In addition, our 
paper answers the call for additional research on the interaction of human behavior and operations 
management (Boudreau et al., 2003; Jouini et al., 2008). Specifically, we consider how individual 
tendencies to engage in social loafing and over-utilization of shared resources may undermine the 
potential benefits of pooling. We explore this by distinguishing the effects of task pooling and resource 
pooling. Our analyses suggest that each of these types of pooling has an effect. As hypothesized, task 
pooling results in longer throughput times because physicians engage in social loafing when they perceive 
that slowing down the task completion process will increase the likelihood that some other physician will 
assume responsibility for the next patient. Similarly, resource pooling lengthens throughput times because 
fast-working physicians utilize a disproportionately large share of resources to the detriment of their 
colleagues working on the same shift.  
 
6.2.   Limitations 
This study has limitations, and its results should be interpreted accordingly. First, we note the threat 
of omitted variable bias that is common to many empirical models. While it would have been helpful to 
be able to include more patient characteristics in our specification, such as patient diagnosis or medical 
comorbidities, these data were protected information and not available for use. However, this is not an 
important threat because patients were randomly assigned to physicians rather than selected by them. This 
is supported by the fact that the average acuity level of patients seen by each physician was less than one 
standard deviation away from the average acuity level of all patients seen in the ED (mean = 3.32, s.d. = 
0.66).  
Second, our study is limited to one hospital’s ED and its response to one intervention that transitioned 
the work system from having pooled tasks and resources to dedicated tasks and resources. This may limit 
the generalizability of our findings, though we believe our findings have strong theoretical underpinnings. 
Nevertheless, we welcome future research on these effects and mechanisms in different empirical 
contexts for further substantiation.  
Third, while it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the effects of increased productivity, 
decreased throughput times, or dedicated work systems on quality, we acknowledge that this is an 
important element to consider in future research. In this paper, we were not able to extend our analysis to 
include the effects on quality because we did not have data on patients’ clinical outcomes. Though this 
may be a particularly important consideration in the context of health care delivery—decreased lengths of 
stay at the expense of health care quality would not be desirable—we argue that this consideration should 
be extended to other contexts as well. We note that prior research has begun to explore these relationships 
between productivity and product quality (Krishnan, Kriebel, Kekre, & Mukhopadhyay, 2000).   22 
 
6.3.   Practical Implications and Conclusions 
Our research also offers valuable practical insights for workplace managers and health care policy 
makers. First, our findings suggest that, in workplaces where workers have discretionary control, the 
potential negative effects of designing pooled systems must be carefully considered. This has implications 
for designing and managing staffing structures and workflows, particularly in the context of service 
delivery organizations.  
Second, our findings suggest that managers should consider implementing group incentives rather 
than individual incentives to motivate workers. This may encourage fast workers to reduce their speed 
just enough so that they will not negatively affect the productivity of others by over-utilizing shared 
resources. While workplaces often seek to incentivize workers through pay-for-performance programs 
that focus on individual productivity, we refer to prior research that compares individual versus collective 
incentives to suggest that a group-level approach may help counteract the negative effects that fast 
workers exhibit on overall productivity levels (Arya & Mittendorf, 2011; Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul, 
2011). 
Specifically in the context of health care, our findings suggest that EDs may benefit from 
implementing non-pooled work systems in which patients are assigned to a doctor-nurse team 
immediately upon arrival. While results may differ across different settings and various information 
technology systems, the mechanisms through which changes in throughput time occurred may help shed 
light on cost savings predictions in other contexts. This could have significant implications for health care 
delivery, especially given the expected increase in ED patient volume as a result of the recent health 
reform legislation (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010). 
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Figure 1. Diagram of the Pre- and Post-TAS Task and Resource Pooling Structure 
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Table 1. Summary definition of variables included in fixed effects models 
 
Variable / Category 
 
Description 
 
Length of stay 
 
Logged number of minutes for which patients stayed in ED.  
Acuity level  5 indicators for patient’s acuity level (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).  
No. of other MDs on shift  Number of other physicians working at the same time as this shift. 
Shift number  Indicator for what number shift this is for this physician in this dataset (since 
January 1, 2007). 
Years since graduation  Number of years since graduation from medical school. 
Day of week  7 indicators for day of week of shift. 
Month  12 indicators for month of shift. 
Year  4 indicators for year of shift. 
Shift type  3 indicators for shift type (AM, PM, overnight). 
Current patient count  Number of total patients currently in the ED. 
Main ED  Shift location ( = 1 for Main ED, = 0 for RCA). 
Fast others  Indicator for presence of at least one above-average productivity worker on 
shift (not including oneself) ( = 1 for present, = 0 for absent). 
TAS implemented  Indicator for whether TAS had been implemented  
( = 1 for post-implementation, = 0 for pre-implementation). 
Interactions  TAS  Main ED. 
TAS  Fast others. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of variables included in fixed effects models
a 
                   
Variable  Mean (SD)  Min.  Max.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
                   
1. Length of stay   220.03 (243.34)  1  2879  1.00           
2. Logged length of stay  5.02 (0.83)  0  7.97  0.83
*  1.00         
3. Other MDs on shift  7.88 (2.51)  1  21  -0.01*  -0.02*  1.00       
4. Shift number  276.07 (165.94)  1  710  -0.08*  -0.10*  0.23*  1.00     
5. Years since graduation  12.65 (7.92)  2  37  0.01*  0.01*  0.05*  0.11*  1.00   
6. Current patient count  34.52 (11.72)  1  84  0.06*  0.12*  0.27*  0.09*  -0.01*  1.10 
                   
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Percent 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Percent 
       
Acuity level 1  0.30  January  7.40
 
Acuity level 2  8.48  February  7.36
b 
Acuity level 3  50.96  March  10.34
b 
Acuity level 4  38.85  April  9.82
b 
Acuity level 5  1.41  May  10.47
b 
Sunday  15.00  June  9.67
b 
Monday  15.03  July  9.99
b 
Tuesday  14.04  August  7.27 
Wednesday  13.60  September  7.13 
Thursday  13.76  October  7.06 
Friday  13.82  November  6.74 
Saturday  14.75  December  6.75 
AM shift  39.57  2007  20.23 
PM shift  47.67  2008  24.83 
Overnight shift  12.76  2009  27.39 
Main ED  66.74  2010  27.55 
Other fast MDs on shift  85.84     
TAS implemented  59.31       
         
* p < 0.05 
a N = 234,334. Excludes observations earlier than March 1, 2007 and after July 31, 2010. 
b Because all observations earlier than March 1, 2007 and after July 31, 2010 have been excluded, it is 
not surprising that a larger percentage of patients in our dataset presented to the ED in the months 
between March and July, inclusive. When these summary statistics are produced with the inclusion of 
observations all from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2010, we obtain an approximately uniform 
distribution of patients across all months of the year. 
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Table 3. Average length of stay in minutes by patient acuity level
a 
       
Acuity level  Mean  s.d.  Frequency 
       
1 (most severe)  287.17  216.73  710 
2  391.47  352.94  19861 
3  279.69  262.83  119424 
4  108.76  98.77  91029 
5 (least severe)  84.29  95.26  3310 
       
a N = 234,334.     31 
Table 4. Fixed effects models for patients’ logged length of stay 
       
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
       
Acuity level 2  0.257***  0.239***  0.257*** 
  (0.0346)  (0.0356)  (0.0347) 
Acuity level 3  -0.0712  -0.0937*  -0.0709 
  (0.0402)  (0.0410)  (0.0402) 
Acuity level 4  -0.692***  -0.706***  -0.692*** 
  (0.0397)  (0.0388)  (0.0397) 
Acuity level 5  -1.050***  -0.944***  -1.050*** 
  (0.0388)  (0.0393)  (0.0389) 
No. of other MDs on shift  0.00448***  -0.00275*  0.00476*** 
  (0.000919)  (0.00136)  (0.000913) 
Shift number  -0.000620***  -0.000274  -0.000599*** 
  (0.000167)  (0.000182)  (0.000164) 
Years since graduation  0.0352  -0.00542  0.0324 
  (0.0263)  (0.0287)  (0.0256) 
PM shift  -0.128***  -0.0862***  -0.129*** 
  (0.00863)  (0.0157)  (0.00857) 
Overnight shift  -0.0356**  0.00272  -0.0356** 
  (0.0119)  (0.0208)  (0.0119) 
Current patient count  0.00934***  0.0136***  0.00932*** 
  (0.000362)  (0.000942)  (0.000361) 
Main ED    0.370***   
    (0.0226)   
Other fast MDs on shift  0.0212*  0.0180*  0.0724*** 
  (0.0105)  (0.00878)  (0.0151) 
TAS   -0.0886***  -0.0157  -0.0228 
  (0.0149)  (0.0165)  (0.0177) 
TAS  Main ED    -0.0990***   
    (0.0150)   
TAS  Other fast MDs on shift      -0.0775*** 
       (0.0165) 
Day of week controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Month controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Year controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Constant  4.910***  4.891***  4.895*** 
  (0.324)  (0.348)  (0.317) 
       
Observations  152,841  228,935  152,841 
Adjusted R
2  0.154  0.327  0.155 
Number of ED physicians  40  40  40 
       
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05 
 